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Protecting the Integrity of the Rhode
Island Judicial System and Assuring
an Adequate Remedy for Victims of
Spoliation: Why An Independent
Cause of Action for the Spoliation of
Evidence Is the Solution
"New and nameless torts are being recognized
constantly.. .. "'
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following situation: An individual driving a
rental car is involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle.
The collision leaves the driver of the rental car severely and per-
manently injured. The injured driver contends that the vehicle's
design, manufacturing, or maintenance defects caused his inju-
ries. The injured driver asserts that the engine of the rental car
intruded into the passenger compartment of the car at the point of
impact causing the severe and permanent injuries. Upon the re-
quest of the injured driver's attorney, the rental company takes
possession of the vehicle and agrees to hold the car for inspection
for a certain time period. Before that time period expires, however,
the wrecked vehicle is sold for scrap, the front of the car is severed
and the engine is removed. According to the opinion of an accident
reconstruction expert, the destruction of the vehicle has made it
impossible to determine whether a defect in the vehicle was the
proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the driver.
This scenario is an example of spoliation of evidence and the
effects such behavior can have on an individual's ability to prove a
1. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 3 (4th
ed. 1971).
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civil claim. Courts have traditionally tried to remedy this problem
by relying on the two civil doctrines of adverse inferences and civil
discovery sanctions. 2 However, in a case based on the same facts
described above, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
that such circumstances called for an expansion of tort liability
and recognized an independent cause of action for the spoliation of
evidence. 3 This Comment will elucidate why the D.C. Court of Ap-
peals was correct in accepting such a cause of action and why
Rhode Island would be well-served by doing the same..
In general terms, the phrase "spoliation of evidence" has been
defined as "the destruction, alteration, or mutilation of evidence
especially by a party for whom the evidence is damaging"; any ac-
tivity that renders evidence permanently unavailable to the judi-
cial process; the failure to preserve property for the use as
evidence. 4 Spoliation is truly a nondiscriminatory offense capable
of multiple permutations that affects the interests of not only par-
ties involved in litigation, but third parties as well. Spoliation can
be intentional or negligent, made in good faith or bad, carried out
during litigation or while there is potential for litigation, and can
be discovered prior to, during or even after a suit has been de-
cided. 5
Because "relevant evidence is critical to the search for the
truth... [and] there can be no truth, fairness, or justice in a civil
action where relevant evidence has been destroyed before trial,"6
the absolute integrity of the judicial system is threatened when
those harmed by spoliation do not receive adequate redress. While
courts have cautiously started to divert away from traditional
remedies and have begun to recognize an independent tort for spo-
liation of evidence, 7 Rhode Island continues to rely on the tradi-
2. Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: LegalControl of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1087-99 (1987).
3. See Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1998).
4. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAw 465 (1996); see also JAMIE S.
GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 1.1, at 4 (1989).
5. See Robert J. Wegener, Ethical Issues in the Practice of Product Dis-
tribution and Marketing Law: Destruction of Evidence and Secret Recordings,ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION AND
MARKETING (March 2004).
6. Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 17 (Mont. 1999).
7. Bart S. Wilhoit, Spoliation of Evidence: The Viability of Four Emerg-
ing Torts, 46 UCLA L. REV. 631, 647 (1998).
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tional remedies when spoliation arises in the civil context. In
Rhode Island, these remedies (primarily civil sanctions and ad-
verse inferences) while traditional, often inadequately compensate
the victim, and are not applicable in many situations where spo-
liation of evidence occurs.8 Furthermore, the failures of the tradi-
tional remedies tarnish the integrity of the judicial system by
hampering the tryers of fact from accurate fact finding, and offer
little deterrence for future spoliators.
This comment addresses spoliation of evidence in the civil
context,9 and advocates that Rhode Island courts recognize an in-
dependent cause of action for such conduct when the existing
remedies do not provide adequate redress for those injured. Part II
highlights the prolific nature and problematic effects of spoliation
in civil matters in general. Part III examines the current position
of an independent tort for spoliation of evidence in Rhode Island,
and any indications that the state courts may or may not be mov-
ing towards the recognition of a separate cause of action. Part IV
provides a description of the traditional remedies for spoliation in
civil matters, which includes adverse inference jury instructions
and civil and criminal sanctions. This section also addresses how
these traditional remedies are applied in Rhode Island. Following
presentation of the traditional remedies, Part V exposes the in-
adequacies of such remedies in their ability to properly address
the harms posed by spoliation in civil litigation. Part VI analyzes
how recognition of these shortcomings has resulted in the crafting
of an independent cause of action. As this comment illustrates, the
independent cause of action has been fashioned in a variety of con-
figurations depending on the particular jurisdiction. Part VI con-
cludes with a recommended independent cause of action that the
Rhode Island courts ought to recognize to maintain their integrity
in providing adequate redress for those injured by the tortious
conduct of others. The Comment concludes that it is inevitable
8. The adverse inference does not act as a substitute for an essential
element of a claim. A victim of spoliation cannot rely on the adverse inference
as required evidence to support their claim. Moreover, the adverse inference,
as well as civil sanctions cannot be used in cases that involve third-party spo-
liators. Id. at 648.
9. While spoliation is certainly a concern for parties in criminal cases,
this comment focuses on civil actions where the duties of the private parties
are not as clearly established as those involving the government.
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that additional cases will come before the state courts where the
traditional remedies will fail to adequately compensate the victim,
and therefore, the only viable solution to such problems is to rec-
ognize an independent tort for spoliation.
II. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE IN THE CIVIL
CONTEXT
Spoliation of evidence can create a number of problems for the
parties involved in civil litigation.O It is important to recognize
though that spoliation of evidence is not a party exclusive issue;
the topic is relevant to both plaintiffs and defendants." Crucial
physical evidence that has been lost, destroyed, or suppressed can
have a significant negative effect on both parties on how a legal
argument is presented and supported in civil litigation.12 For the
plaintiff, the absence of such relevant evidence can hinder the
ability to properly prove its claim. On the other hand, if the plain-
tiff is the party who commits spoliation, the defendant may feel
that his ability and opportunity to present a valid defense had
been interfered with. 3 Also, the absence of pivotal physical evi-
dence may also "inhibit the timely settlement of the matter by the
parties." 4 Finally, as a last concern, the ability to achieve the two
most important goals of the judicial system, truth and fairness,
are impeded by the destruction of evidence.'5 Restricting the spo-
liation of evidence is therefore justified because such conduct less-
ens the probability that the judicial process will reach fair and
accurate results.16
Spoliation of evidence in civil actions results from varying
levels of conduct, ranging from negligent to intentional, and can
10. Kathleen L. Daeer-Bannon, Esq., Cause of Action for Spoliation of
Evidence, CAUSES OF ACTION SECOND SERIES 249 (West 2002). The doctrine of
spoliation of evidence has grown out of a recognition that a plaintiff has a le-gally protected interest in a civil suit, and this interest can be harmed by spo-
liation.
11. Joseph J. Ortego & Glen M. Vogel, Spoliation of Evidence, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS (2000).12. Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend To-
wards Recognition of Spoliation As a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 38
(1993).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Solum & Marzen, supra note 2, at 1138.
16. Id.
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involve not only the immediate parties involved in the underlying
litigation, but also third parties not involved in the primary civil
suit. Because of the variety of forms of spoliation, a number of
remedies have been fashioned by the courts to protect a plaintiffs
interest, as well as the interest of the judicial system as a whole.
Increasingly, state courts are being faced with the decision
whether to expand on the traditional remedies by recognizing an
independent cause of action for spoliation of evidence.
The first attempt to prevent spoliation of evidence by the judi-
ciary was first recorded in 1722, in the case of Armory v. De-
lamirie. 17 The doctrine of spoliation was recorded for the first time
in this case, where the court allowed the plaintiff to bring an ac-
tion in trover against a jeweler who had spoliated a jewel.' 8 The
remedy applied by the judge was an instruction to the jury that
unless the defendant produced the jewel and was able to prove its
low quality, the jury was to presume the jewel was of the finest
quality and damages should be determined accordingly. 19 The
common law spoliation doctrine established by Armory, remained
the standard used by English and American courts for over one
hundred years. 20 Thus, the adverse jury instruction became the
most commonly used remedy in spoliation of evidence matters.
As claims of spoliation in civil matters rise, it is necessary to
examine if the traditional, common remedies, such as the adverse
instruction are still adequate to provide redress to the victim, and
deter the potential spoliator. Today, in a legal environment that
can fairly be described as "win at all cost," claims of spoliation
"tend to permeate the prosecution of civil matters."21 A survey by
Harvard Law Professor Charles R. Nesson, concluded that half of
all litigators described problems with the spoliation of evidence as
"frequent" or "regular."22 When discussing the rampant character
of spoliation in civil matters, "[i]t would be difficult to exaggerate
17. 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Wilhoit, supra note 7, at 638.
21. Spencer, supra note 12, at 38-39.
22. See Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litiga-
tion: The Need for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOzO L. REV. 793, 793
(1991). There is an "overwhelming" incentive to suppress or destroy evidence
because the adverse party is unlikely to discover the destroyed evidence, or
the act of destroying the evidence itself. Id. at 795.
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the pervasiveness of evasive practices" carried out by individuals
who possess physical evidence. 23 Traditionally, the courts have at-
tempted to deal with the problem of spoliation in civil matters24 in
a variety of ways, including jury instructions, criminal and civil
discovery sanctions, exclusion of evidence, and default judg-
ments. 25 However, these traditional remedies do not provide ade-
quate relief in all circumstances, and therefore it is time for Rhode
Island to recognize an independent tort action for spoliation of
evidence in the civil context.
III. CURRENT POSITION ON AN INDEPENDENT TORT FOR SPOLIATION OF
EVIDENCE IN RHODE ISLAND
In Malinowski v. Documented Vehicle/Drivers Systems, Inc. ,26
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated
that, "[n]either the Rhode Island legislature nor the Rhode Island
Supreme Court has yet established or recognized the existence of
an independent tort for the spoliation of evidence." 27 The court fur-
ther announced, "[w]hile both the magistrate judge and the dis-
trict court judge concluded that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
would not create such a tort, we see no need to delve into un-
charted waters of Rhode Island law and endeavor to prophesize
whether the Rhode Island Supreme Court would adopt an inde-
pendent tort for spoliation of evidence." 28 Because this is the most
relevant case involving an independent cause of action in Rhode
Island, it requires further analysis.
The litigation that spawned Malinowski began in 1993 as a
wrongful death action brought in Rhode Island state court by a
mother whose son who was killed in a horrific accident. 29 After a
23. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness,
Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 787, 829.
24. The scope of this comment is limited to spoliation in the civil context.
25. See Jay E. Rivlin, Note, Recognizing an Independent Tort Action Will
Spoil a Spoliator's Splendor, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1003, 1005 (1998).
26. Malinowski v. Documented Vehicle/Drivers Sys., Inc., 66 Fed. Appx.
216 (1st Cir. 2003). While this case is an "unpublished opinion" and subject to
limitations as to citation and precedential value, the Author references the
case merely to reflect the First Circuit's current perspective on spoliation in
Rhode Island courts.
27. Id. at 222.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 217-19 (discussing the procedural history of the plaintiff's state
court proceedings).
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second jury returned a verdict for the defendants, the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court agreed to hear the plaintiffs appeal. 30 On ap-
peal, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the trial justice erred by
failing to issue an adverse inference jury instruction on the doc-
trine of spoliation.31 However, because the issue on appeal was
only the trial justice's discretion in not offering the adverse infer-
ence instruction, the court did not address the possibility of a new
independent cause of action to provide a remedy for the plaintiff.
Following the dismissal of her appeal by the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court, the plaintiff brought an independent tort action in
the Rhode Island state court claiming that the condition of the ta-
chograph apparatus was "the cause of her inability to obtain a fa-
vorable verdict in the wrongful death suit."32 It was essentially the
claim of Ms. Malinowski that had the device not been "destroyed,"
it would have shown that the driver of the trailer was traveling at
an excessive speed at the time her son was struck and killed.33 The
defendants removed the action to federal court, and immediately
filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that Rhode Island
did not recognize an independent cause of action for spoliation of
evidence. 34
A federal magistrate judge granted summary judgment for
the defendants and noted that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
had not recognized a separate and independent tort for spolia-
30. Malinowski v. United Parcel Serv., 792 A.2d 50, 52 (R.I. 2002). In
1991, the fourteen-year-old son of the plaintiff was killed after being struck
by a tractor-trailer driven by an employee of the defendant, United Parcel
Service. Id. Two years later, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action; the
trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants. Id. On appeal, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that an improper instruction warranted a new trial. Id.
Following the second trial, the jury again returned a verdict for the defen-
dants; the trial justice denied the plaintiffs motions for judgment as a matter
of law, and for a new trial. Id. at 53.
31. Id. at 54. The plaintiff argued that the defendant had tampered with
the tachograph apparatus (a recording device placed in commercial vehicles
that records the movement and speed of the vehicle) in the truck that struck
her son such that "certain mechanisms necessary to establish the tachograph
evidence were destroyed while in the possession of [the defendant]." Id. The
trial justice refused to issue the spoliation instruction because "there was no
explicit request made as to what evidence was the subject of an argument re-
garding spoliation." Id.
32. Malinowski, 66 Fed. Appx. at 221.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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tion.35 Furthermore, the magistrate stated that it was unlikely
Rhode Island would do so given the problems the tort would create
and the fact that the majority of "the states' highest courts consid-
ering the issue have declined to adopt a separate and independent
cause of action for spoliation of evidence."36 The magistrate further
held that even if Rhode Island had recognized the tort, the plain-
tiff had failed to provide evidence that would establish the re-
quired elements in her case.37 In addressing the magistrate's
decision, the First Circuit explained that because the tachographic
disc was not destroyed, mutilated, or significantly altered, but
rather was merely discolored and in "poor condition," such was not
sufficient to make out a spoliation tort.38 Because of this, the mag-
istrate concluded that Ms. Malinowski had failed to demonstrate
that the condition of the evidence was the cause of her inability to
obtain a favorable verdict.39 Additionally, the First Circuit's
evaluation of the magistrate's report and recommendation appears
to require a plaintiff to prove the reason why the evidence is in
such poor condition before such a condition can rise to the level of
spoliation. 40
Ms. Manilowski objected to the repbrt and recommendation,
however, the district court agreed with the magistrate's prophetic
conclusion that Rhode Island would not recognize the independent
cause of action for spoliation of evidence. 41 The district court con-
cluded that even if the tort were recognized and available as a
cause of action, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in the
plaintiffs wrongful death claim, regarding the lack of materiality
of the "newly discovered" evidence of spoliation, had the effect of
eliminating an essential element of such a tort claim.42 In other
35. Id.
36. See id. (quoting Malinowski v. United Postal Serv., Inc. , C.A. 01-
273ML, report and recommendation, at 9 (D.R.I. May 10, 2002).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id at 222. "Moreover, in the absence of evidence why the disc was in
poor condition, there was insufficient proof that defendants had intended to
damage the disc." Id at 221.
41. Id at 221.
42. Id. The determination by the Rhode Island Supreme Court was that
the "newly discovered" evidence regarding potential spoliation of the disc
"was not material enough to affect the outcome of the trial." Malinowski v.
United Parcel Serv., 792 A.2d 50, 55, 57 (2002).
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words, even if there had been spoliation, it would not have af-
fected the outcome of the plaintiffs wrongful death claim. The dis-
trict court then entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of
the defendants. 43 The district court accepted the magistrate's re-
port and recommendation, and entered judgment as a matter of
law in favor of the defendants." On appeal to the First Circuit, the
court agreed with the conclusions of both the magistrate and the
district court, and concluded that there was no recognizable tort in
Rhode Island, and even if there were, Ms. Malinowski had failed
to satisfy the necessary elements. 45
Therefore, presently, an independent tort for spoliation has
not been recognized in Rhode Island. There is also speculation
from the federal courts that the Rhode Island Supreme Court
would not recognize such an independent tort. It has also been
speculated by those same federal courts, however, that there are
some elements to such causes of action that may exist, yet were
not met in the case. Does this indicate that an independent tort
for spoliation of evidence is an available remedy, but that the ap-
propriate fact pattern, with the proper elements has not reached
the Rhode Island courts? Furthermore, if Rhode Island does not
recognize an independent tort claim for spoliation, what recourse
is available to parties who are victims of spoliation of evidence?
IV. THE TRADITIONAL REMEDIES FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE IN
CIVIL MATTERS AND How THEY HAVE BEEN APPLIED BY THE
RHODE ISLAND JUDICIARY
When litigants turn to the courts for adjudication of their
grievances, the courts must protect the rights of the parties, in-
cluding the right to a fair hearing that makes use of all the avail-
able relevant evidence. The courts have adopted different methods
to protect innocent parties from spoliation of evidence, but the
remedies established have only been mildly successful at best.46
The remedies or sanctions for spoliation "range from a slap on the
wrist to the severe."47 However, the basis behind all types of
43. See Malinowski, 66 Fed. Appx. at 221.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 222.
46. See Spencer, supra note 12, at 40.
47. Wegener, supra note 5.
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remedies for spoliation, whether lenient or serve are based on two
established public policy rationales: redress and deterrence. 48
The policy of redress, or compensation, encompasses the idea
that a prejudiced party ought to be restored to the position they
would have occupied had the spoliation not occurred.49 Concur-
rently, deterring others from committing a similar wrongful act is
the punitive rationale that provides the other basis for remedy. 50
Amongst these two theories though, the driving force in spoliation
matters has been to compensate the victim for the adverse impact
the missing evidence has on his or her underlying case.51 Rather
than the mere punishment of the spoliator, courts have found that
the more important considerations in selecting a remedy or sanc-
tion are the degree of prejudice caused by the loss, and what rem-
edy will lessen the impact on that party.5 2
From the time of the King's Bench decision in Armory, courts
have relied on a balancing test to determine the appropriate rem-
edy and the severity of the sanction to redress situations where
spoliation has occurred. 53 Factors analyzed in the balancing test
include:
(1) the degree of fault of the party who spoliated the evi-
dence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing
party; (3) the availability of a lesser sanction that will
avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party; and
(4) the potential of the sanction deterring such conduct by
others.54
Over time though, courts have generally been in agreement
that the determination of whether or not to impose sanctions, and
if so, which type, is influenced predominantly by two of these fac-
tors.55 The two most important factors that "have taken on greater
importance in most cases on sanctions for spoliation [are]: (1) the
48. See Rivlin, supra note 25, at 1009.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Wegner, supra note 5.
52. See id.
53. Brooks Morel, Now You See It, Now You Don't: A Georgia Perspective
on Spoliation of Evidence, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1163, 1173 (2001).
54. Rivlin, supra note 25, at 1006.
55. MARGARET M. KOESEL ET AL., SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND
REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 33 (2000).
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culpability of the offender, or the alleged mental state which gives
rise to the destruction of evidence, and (2) the degree of prejudice
or harm which resulted from the actions of the offender."56 When
these factors are balanced and the court determines that a remedy
is required, remedies can be awarded in various forms, including
adverse inference jury instructions and other civil sanctions as the
most common result. Unfortunately, despite the balancing test
which examines the harm spoliation causes to parties in litigation,
an independent claim in tort is rarely allowed, and instead the
court relies on the traditional remedies to compensate those who
have suffered from the spoliation.
A. The Adverse Inference57
The adverse inference jury instruction is the most prevalent
remedy for the spoliation of evidence.58 When a court employs the
adverse inference, the jury is instructed that it may infer from the
fact that the evidence is missing or altered, that the evidence
would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for the spo-
liation.5 9 The legendary jurist, Judge Learned Hand articulated
the rationale behind the adverse inference when he said, "When a
party is once found to be fabricating, or suppressing, documents,
the natural, indeed, the inevitable, conclusion is that he has some-
thing to conceal, and is conscious of guilt."6 0 Here then, it is the
culpability of the alleged spoliator which provides the justification
for the adverse inference.
While the adverse inference is widely used, many courts apply
it only when certain conditions are met. For example, some courts
will not give the instruction without a showing of bad faith or in-
tentional behavior.61 Other courts permit the instruction by a
56. Id. (quoting Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 167 F.R.D. 90,
102 (D. Colo. 1996)) (internal quotations omitted). Koesel goes on to discuss
these two factors in greater detail. See generally id. at 33- 35.
57. Courts have articulated that the underlying rationales for the ad-
verse inference are remediation, deterrence, and punishment. Id. at 36.
58. Morel, supra note 53, at 1174.
59. Id.
60. Warner Barnes & Co. v. Kokosai Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 102 F.2d
450, 453 (2d Cir.), modified, 103 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1939).
61. Rivlin, supra note 25, at 1009. In Connecticut, the trier of fact must
be satisfied that four factors are proven before an adverse inference may be
drawn against the spoliator. See Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d
2005] 805
806 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.O:795
showing of mere negligence on the part of the spoliator. 62 Overall,
the burden typically falls on the spoliator to prove the evidence
was not unfavorable to his case. 63 However, even when the initial
burden has been established and the adverse inference is permit-
ted, because of the fact that the inference is permissive, rather
than mandatory, this most common remedy cannot always provide
redress for those affected by the spoliation of evidence.
Despite this troubling characteristic, the adverse jury instruc-
tion is often the remedy employed in Rhode Island for issues of
spoliation of evidence. The Rhode Island Supreme Court first ad-
dressed the doctrine of spoliation in Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Nat'l. Bank v. Eastern Gen. Contractors, Inc. 64 There, the plaintiff
bank moved to exclude evidence regarding a telephone conversa-
tion between the bank and a representative of the defendant,
which allegedly had been recorded by the plaintiff but was no
longer in existence. 65 The court held that the defendant was enti-
tled to present evidence to the jury that a recording did exist be-
fore it was destroyed by the bank.66 The court went on to hold that
under the spoliation doctrine, the deliberate or negligent destruc-
tion of relevant evidence by a party may give rise to an inference
that the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the
offending party.67 Furthermore, the court held that a showing of
bad faith on the part of the spoliator, while may perhaps
strengthen the inference, is not necessary to permit such an infer-
ence.68 Without deciding whether in the particular case the ad-
verse inference would be permitted, the court opined that the
doctrine of spoliation "supports [the] conclusion that, at the very
829, 832-33 (Conn. 1996). The factors are: (1) the spoliation must be inten-
tional; (2) the evidence must be relevant to the issue for which the party
seeks the inference; (3) the non-spoliator must have acted with due diligence
with respect to the evidence in question; and (4) the trier of fact must be in-
structed that it is not required to make the adverse inference, unless the pre-
vious three factors are satisfied. Id.
62. Morel, supra note 53, at 1174.
63. Id. at 1174-75.
64. 674 A.2d 1227, 1234 (R.I. 1996).
65. See id. at 1234.
66. Id. The court cited several decisions by different Courts of Appeals
that had relied on the doctrine omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatiorem ("all
things are presumed against a despoiler") in making similar decisions. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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least, such evidence should not have been withheld from the
jury."69 Since then, as is the case in the majority of jurisdictions,
Rhode Island courts rely on the adverse inference70 as the most
called upon remedy for spoliation in civil actions.
Since the Supreme Court of Rhode Island first articulated the
spoliation doctrine in the civil context in Eastern General, the nec-
essary conditions under which the adverse instruction will be
given has undergone an evolution. Over time though, the principle
has become well-established that "the deliberate or negligent de-
struction of relevant evidence by a party to litigation may give rise
to an inference that the destroyed evidence was unfavorable to
69. Id.
70. The Model Civil Jury Instructions for Rhode Island provides a model
instruction for the spoliation or destruction of Evidence:
During this trial you have heard testimony that one of the parties
destroyed/mutilated evidence. When evidence is destroyed we call it
"spoliation" of that evidence. Under certain circumstances the spolia-
tion of evidence may give rise to an averse inference that the de-
stroyed/mutilated evidence would have been unfavorable to the
position of the party who destroyed/mutilated it.
Spoliation of evidence may be innocent or intentional, or somewhere
between the two. It is the unexplained and deliberate destruc-
tion/mutilation of relevant evidence that gives rise to an inference
that the thing destroyed/mutilated would have been unfavorable to
the position of the spoliator. If you find that [party A] de-
stroyed/mutilated [identify of evidence at issue] and did so deliber-
ately then you are permitted to infer that the jury's consideration of
that evidence would have been unfavorable to [party Al's position in
this case.
In deciding whether the destruction/mutilation of [identify evidence
at issue] was deliberate you may consider all of the facts and circum-
stances which were proved at trial and which are pertinent to that
item of evidence. You may consider who destroyed it, how it was de-
stroyed, the legitimacy or lack of legitimacy in the reasons given for
its destruction, the timing of the destruction, whether the individual
destroying the evidence knew the evidence might be supportive of
the opposing party, whether the spoliation was intended to deprive
the court of evidence, and any other facts and circumstances which
you find to be true. You may also consider the extent to which it has
been shown that the spoliated evidence would, indeed, have been un-
favorable to [party Al's position. If the spoliation of the evidence is
attributable to carelessness or negligence on the part of the spoliator
you may consider whether the carelessness or negligence was so
gross as to amount to a deliberate act of spoliation.
MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR RHODE ISLAND § 402.3 (Rhode Island
Bar Ass'n. 2003).
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that party."71 When the instruction is given, the jury is instructed
that "such an adverse inference is permissible, but not manda-
tory."72 Similarly, the court has held that the inference derived
from the doctrine of spoliation is not only permissive, but that if
the inference is to be drawn, it is not to be considered conclusive73
Further, the instruction does not automatically follow from a
party's blanket suggestion that evidence was destroyed. A trialjudge is given discretion to refuse to give the instruction when
"there [is] no explicit request made as to what evidence was sub-ject of an argument regarding spoliation."74 A trial judge is not ob-
ligated to issue the requested adverse inference instruction if the
party seeking the inference merely implies that the other party
mishandled a piece of evidence, without presenting any further
evidence or explanation75 To meet the evidentiary standard for
the instruction, the party requesting the instruction must offer
evidence that the un-produced evidence was either relevant or
that it was deliberately destroyed.76 Note that this is an "or" test
and that if the evidence is relevant, that is often enough.
When a party raises the issue of spoliation by an opposing
party and presents evidence to support such a claim, the party al-
leged to have destroyed the evidence may not shift the burden
back to the party who raised the issue by arguing that the com-
plaining party has failed to prove that the evidence was in fact de-
stroyed.7 7 When a defendant argues that their conduct does not
rise to the level of spoliation deserving of the adverse instruction,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has required a satisfactory ex-
71. Tancrelle v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 756 A.2d 744, 748 (R.I. 2000);
see, e.g., Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Ass'n, 820 A.2d 929, 946 (R.I. 2003)(quoting Tancrelle, 756 A.2d at 748); State v. Barnes, 777 A.2d 140, 145 (R.I.2001) (quoting Tancrelle, 756 A.2d at 748).
72. Farrell v. Connett Trailer Sales, Inc., 727 A.2d 183, 188 (R.I. 1999)(emphasis added).
73. Tancrelle, 756 A.2d at 749 (citing N.H. Ins. Co. v. Rouselle, 723 A.2d
111, 114 (R.I. 1999)).
74. Malinowski v. United Parcel Serv., 729 A.2d 50, 54 (R.I. 2002) (quot-ing the trial judge from the trial court proceedings) (internal quotations omit-
ted).
75. Id. at 55.
76. See Tancrelle, 756 A.2d at 748 (noting that the Court has held that
"although a showing of bad faith may strengthen the inference of spoliation,
such a showing is not essential." (citing Farrell, 727 A.2d at 186)).77. Mead v. Papa Razzi Restaurant, 840 A.2d 1103, 1108, (R.I. 2004).
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planation of why evidence might be missing.78 The court has
stated that it will "decline to allow defendant[s] to benefit from
[their] own unexplained failure to preserve and produce respon-
sive and relevant information during discovery."
79
B. Civil and Criminal Sanctions
In addition to the adverse jury instructions, courts have also
attempted to apply civil and criminal sanctions against spoliators
through their sanctioning powers that are rooted in the rules of
civil procedure as well as in the inherent powers of the court.
80
The sanctions often include issue preclusion, dismissal, summary
judgment, default judgment, or the exclusion of expert testimony
or other evidence.8' Courts have also relied on their inherent pow-
ers to sanction pre-litigation spoliators.82 "Thus, once a victim
brings the underlying claim to court, the court has inherent power
to sanction the defendant spoliator for the defendant's action prior
to trial."83 Because spoliation of evidence inhibits a trial court's
ability and necessity to hear evidence and determine facts accu-
rately, both state and federal courts have recognized this inherent
power as necessary to ensure the proper administration of jus-
tice.84 The force and finality of these civil sanctions vary greatly
however, depending on the court's evaluation of a number of fac-
tors such as: (1) the culpability of the spoliator, (2) the amount of
prejudice to the nonoffending party, (3) the degree of interference
with the judicial process, (4) the likelihood that lesser sanctions
78. See id.
79. Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Ass'n., 820 A.2d 929, 947 (R.I. 2003)
(holding spoliation instructions appropriate in light of defendant's failure to
produce board meeting minutes for meeting where accident may have been
discussed); see also Mead, 840 A.2d at 1108 (holding that after testimony re-
vealed that defendants systematically prepared and retained incident re-
ports, without a satisfactory explanation that such report never existed, the
jury should be permitted to draw an inference that production of such a re-
port would be adverse to their cause).
80. Morel, supra note 53, at 1175. The destruction or concealment of evi-
dence in civil matters is not specifically prohibited by any federal statute, and
many states do not have substantive law concerning spoliation. Spencer, su-
pra note 12, at 41.
81. Morel, supra note 53, at 1175.
82. Id.
83. Wilhoit, supra note 7, at 649.
84. See KOESEL ET AL., supra note 55, at 30.
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would provide a remedy and deter future acts of spoliation, (5)
whether the evidence in question has been permanently lost; and(6) whether the sanctions will unfairly punish a party for miscon-
duct on the part of the lawyer.85
Issue preclusion and dismissal with prejudice are two civil
sanctions that have been applied in both negligent and intentional
spoliation situations.86 Because the effects of these sanctions are
so powerful though, whenever possible, courts choose to apply
lesser sanctions instead of these more fatal sanctions.8 7 When a
dismissal with prejudice is actually granted against the plaintiff,
any evidence discovered after the dismissal is moot, even if the
evidence was significant and may have helped establish a prima
facie case.88 While summary judgment or dismissal are the most
potent sanctions against a plaintiff in spoliation situations, a de-
fault judgment is the "ultimate sanction against a defendant un-
der Rule 37."89 Because these remedies are so severe and final,
and because courts have a strong desire that cases be decided on
the merits, dismissal and default judgments are rarely used.90 In
85. See id. at 32-33. Courts have generally agreed that the two most im-portant factors to be considered are (1) the culpability of the spoliator, or the
mental state that gave rise to the spoliation, and (2) the amount of prejudice
or injury which resulted from the conduct of the spoliator. Id. at 33.86. See Morel, supra note 53, at 1175-76. One form of issue preclusion isthe exclusion of expert testimony. At least one court has reasoned that publicpolicy demands that "an expert should not be permitted to intentionally or
negligently destroy ... evidence, and then to substitute his or her own de-
scription of it." Nally v. Volkswagen, 539 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (Mass. 1989).87. See Morel, supra note 53, at 1176. While many courts prefer to apply
the sanction of summary judgment instead of dismissal, the result is usually
the same, "a victory for the aggrieved party." Id. (citing Rivlin, supra note 25,
at 1012).
88. See Rivlin, supra note 25, at 1011. There are several factors a court
may consider when determining whether the appropriate sanction in a par-
ticular case is that of dismissal: (1) the degree of willfulness of the offendingparty; (2) the extent to which the non-offending party would be prejudiced by
a lesser sanction; (3) the severity a dismissal relative to the severity of the
abuse; (4) whether any evidence has been irreparably lost; (5) the policy fa-
voring adjudication on the merits of the claim; (6) whether the sanction will
operate unfairly by penalizing a party for the misconduct of the attorney; and(7) the need to deter the parties and future litigants from similar abuses. Id.
89. Morel, supra note 53, at 1176.
90. KOESEL ET AL., supra note 55, at 45. "[Dlefault judgment is the most
severe sanction a court can impose on a defendant and is proper only in those
cases where actions of a party showed deliberate, contumacious, or unwar-
ranted disregard for the court's authority." In re Marriage of Lai, 625 N.E.2d
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extreme cases, however, especially where a party demonstrates ei-
ther bad-faith by the spoliator, or where the prejudice is so severe
that these extreme remedies are the only ones that will effectively
redress the harm, courts are willing to impose such sanctions.
91
Civil sanctions imposed in pending litigation are not the only
available remedies. In addition to the sanctions previously men-
tioned, a number of states have established statutes which impose
criminal sanctions for the spoliation of evidence when such action
reaches the level of obstruction of justice.92 It has been suggested,
however, that because most spoliation is only considered a misde-
meanor, courts are unlikely to prosecute individuals under such
statutes.93 Furthermore, because one would only be punished for a
misdemeanor, the potential for deterrence is low. "When faced
with the choice between committing the minor crime of destroying
evidence to cover up for a more serious offense or to protect
[one] self from a large civil monetary judgment, a spoliator would
chose to commit the spoliation and face a minor criminal sanc-
tion."94
When examining the sanctions, it must be remembered that
litigants are not the only persons subject to the court's sanctions,
as attorneys may also be subject to court sanctions and discipline
for either the actual spoliation of evidence, or assisting in such
conduct.95 According to the Model Rule of Professional Conduct
3.4, "[a] lawyer shall not... alter, destroy or conceal a document
or other material having potential evidentiary value," "falsify evi-
dence," or assist in such acts. 96 In order to prohibit lawyers from
actively participating in or knowingly allowing the spoliation of
potentially relevant evidence to occur, many states have adopted a
330, 334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
91. See KOESEL ET AL., supra note 55, at 45.
92. Morel, supra note 53, at 1177.
93. Id. Additionally, with the criminal justice system so immersed in ma-
jor felony cases, the dockets do not allow for the prosecution of spoliation
cases. Id. at 1177-78.
94. Rivlin, supra note 25, at 1017. The federal obstruction of justice stat-
ute, which is a felony, has been applied in the context of spoliation of evi-
dence as well. See Wegener, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing a case in federal
district court where the Department of Justice filed a single felony count
against a company, alleging obstruction of justice, after the company had al-
legedly destroyed documents related to an investigation by the Department).
95. Morel, supra note 53, at 1178.
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2003).
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similar rule.97 In these jurisdictions, an attorney who violates such
a rule may be subject to fines, suspension, or liability for malprac-
tice.98
The current civil and evidentiary sanctions imposed for the
spoliation of evidence in the Rhode Island courts are not unlike
those discussed above, with some minor alterations and distinc-
tions. For example, similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37,
Rhode Island Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) permits
a court to "make such orders and enter such judgment in regard to
the failure or refusal [to provide discovery] as are just."99 The
available sanctions under Rule 37(b) include dismissal or defaultjudgment, the striking of pleadings or portions of pleadings, and
the refusal of allowing the offending party to support or oppose
certain claims or defenses.100 Rule 37 (b) has been presumed to be
applicable when a party has failed to produce evidence due to the
fact that it has been destroyed or disposed of. 101
The type of conduct required for a specific sanction, however,
has not always been clear. In Sampson v. Marshall Brass Co., 102
the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that "it appears uncertain
whether Rule 37 (b) (2) permits dismissal with prejudice of a
party's action for spoliation of evidence in circumstances in which
the inability to produce the requested evidence for discovery is not
the result of any willful or intentional conduct on the part of the
litigant."103 Addressing the wide range of culpability that poten-
tially could be involved in spoliation, the court observed that
"[diestruction of potentially relevant evidence obviously occurs
along a continuum of fault - ranging from innocence through the
degrees of negligence to intentional[ly].'"104 In determining the ap-
propriate sanction for the spoliation of relevant evidence, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has condoned the use of five ac-
cepted factors: (1) whether the defendant was prejudiced; (2)
97. Morel, supra note 53, at 1178.
98. Id.
99. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Cirv. P. 37(b).
100. Id.
101. See Sampson v. Marshall Brass Co., 661 A.2d 971 (R.I. 1995).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 971.
104. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Eastern Gen. Contractors,
Inc., 674 A.2d 1227, 1234 (R.I. 1996) (quoting Welsh v. United States, 884
F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988)).
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whether the prejudice can be cured; (3) the practical importance of
the evidence; (4) whether the spoliator acted in good or bad faith;
and (5) the potential for abuse if the evidence is not excluded.
10 5
However, courts have later held that simply taking into account
these five factors is not enough; rather they must be applied and
connected to the sanction in an appropriate manner.
Farrell v. Connetti Trailer Sales, Inc.,106 is a further example
of how the trial court's discretion, in deciding which sanction to
apply, has been refine& In Farrell, the court held that even
though the trial judge appropriately considered the five factors
listed above before determining the applicable sanction for spolia-
tion of evidence, the judge had abused his discretion in selecting a
suitable remedy. 10 7 There, spoliation of a key piece of evidence - a
mobile home- resulted in the exclusion of relevant evidence and a
dismissal of the plaintiffs suit. 08 Owners of a mobile home had
sued the manufacturers of the vehicle for damages allegedly
caused by defective repairs. 10 9 The owners had the bank repossess
the mobile home before they sued the defendants, and therefore,
the defendants were unable to inspect the mobile home after the
suit was filed to determine if the repairs were in fact defective." 0
The trial judge precluded the owners from introducing any evi-
dence concerning the condition of the mobile home after the de-
fendants performed the initial repairs, and without this evidence,
the court dismissed the plaintiffs claim."' On appeal, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that excluding all the plaintiffs evi-
dence related to the post-defendant-repairs was unwarranted be-
cause the defendants failed to introduce any evidence of "bad faith
or willful destruction of this evidence."" 2 The case was remanded
with the instruction that the spoliation sanction be limited to the
adverse inference. 1 3 Due to the potential harshness and finality of
many civil sanctions, the Rhode Island Supreme Court seemed to
be suggesting that the trial courts should impose the least damag-
105. Farrell v. Connetti Trailer Sales, Inc., 727 A.2d 183, 187 (R.I. 1999).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 184.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 187.
113. Id. at 188.
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ing sanction that will eliminate the prejudice to the non-spoliating
party.114 In other words, this case could potentially stand for the
proposition that without a showing of willful destruction, victims
of spoliation of evidence will be limited to the remedy of an ad-
verse jury instruction.
While it does make available the adverse jury instruction, as
well as other procedural remedies, Rhode Island does not have a
statute that recognizes destruction of evidence in a civil action as
a crime.1 5 Therefore, unlike other jurisdictions with such statutes,
and where deterrence is a likely result, Rhode Island is void of any
potential deterrence that would emanate from such a statute.
Rhode Island does offer some protection in that a lawyer is forbid-
den from unlawfully obstructing another party's access to evidence
or unlawfully altering, destroying or assisting another to do so
under Rhode Island Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4.116 While this
ethical rule may provide some deterrence for lawyers, it is com-
pletely ineffective in deterring an individual who is not subject to
the Rules of Conduct.
V. INADEQUACIES OF TRADITIONAL REMEDIES
As it has been mentioned, and will be further discussed below,
the traditional spoliation remedies are laden with problems. For
example, under the rules of civil procedure, the courts are limited
in exercising their sanctioning authority. One particular limit that
hiders effectual sanctioning of spoliation is Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which states, "a party only can be sanc-
tioned for direct violations of a court order or a discovery re-
quest."1 7 What this means is that any spoliation that occurs prior
to litigation is not subject to Rule 37. An unfortunate result of this
limitation is that a party may be encouraged to destroy evidence
prior to the commencement of litigation or discovery.118 Further-
114. See KOESELETAL., supra note 55, at 151.115. Rhode Island does have a statute that prohibits the obstruction ofjustice, R.I. G. L. § 11-32-1, et. seq., however, the statute does not address thedestruction, tampering, or manipulating of evidence in civil actions.
116. R.I. ST. S. CT. art. V. R. P. C. Rule 3.4 (2005).
117. Wilhoit, supra note 7, at 649; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 37. Because
many states have adopted rules of procedure similar to the Federal Rules, thelanguage attaches not only to federal courts, but to a majority of state courts
as well.
118. KOESEL ET AL., supra note 55, at 29.
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more, more general problems with the traditional remedies for
spoliation include (1) the remedies are not severe enough to truly
deter potential spoliators; (2) the remedies are designed to be used
during a trial and not after 19; (3) the remedies are virtually inef-
fective when the spoliation is carried out by a nonparty; and (4)
the remedies do not properly compensate the litigant who has
been harmed by the spoliation and who usually bears the financial
burden of discovering the spoliation. 120 These problems are not go-
ing away, and while the problems may certainly be worse without
the use of the current remedies, that does not preclude the adop-
tion of more effective means for dealing with the problem.
Because of the inadequacies of the traditional remedies, Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes postulated that individuals actually
have an incentive to spoliate. 12' Holmes wrote that the law must
be viewed from the perspective of the "bad man" who takes action
only after calculating the risks against the advantages of his be-
havior. 22 As a "pure cost-benefit calculator, the bad man will
commit the tort or crime if the expected gain exceeds the expected
loss."123 The traditional remedies to spoliation imposed both in
Rhode Island and many other jurisdictions are ravaged with
weaknesses. Thus after calculating the risks of harm to potential
advantages, the "bad man's" calculation will often lead to an re-
sult that will favor the destruction of evidence.12 4 The risk of being
caught is low, and even if caught, the penalties are so lenient that
compared to the significant potential for large benefits from spo-
hating evidence, (such as avoiding liability where the potential
monetary damages are enormous, and punishment is minimal) the
bad man will opt for the withholding or destruction of evidence. 25
One of the most obvious shortcomings of the traditional spo-
liation remedies becomes apparent when spoliation is committed
by a nonparty. Under the traditional remedies, a judge can only
119. If spoliation is discovered more than one year after final judgment,
the court is unable to apply the traditional remedies in an attempt to redress
the victim. See Rivlin, supra note 25, at 1015.
120. Id. at 1013.
121. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 459 (1897).
122. See id.
123. See Nesson, supra note 22, at 795.
124. Id.
125. Rivlin, supra note 25, at 1013-14.
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hold a party responsible for spoliation if that party is before the
court. 126 If a nonparty has negligently or intentionally spoliated
evidence, the party who is "responsible" for the nonparty is
charged, rather than the nonparty itself.127 The problem with this
remedy is that the wrong party is punished; one party is held re-
sponsible for the actions of another. Because the court has a lim-
ited authority under the procedural rules, all the traditional
remedies must be connected to the underlying lawsuit. 128 This pos-
ses the biggest threat to injured parties who have suffered harm
at the hands of a third party.
Rhode Island has an interest in providing adequate relief to
those who are harmed as a result of the wrongdoing of another.
When the right to present relevant evidence in a civil matter is
hampered by the acts, either intentional or negligent, of another,
the deprived party may be unable to prove their claim. The most
commonly used remedy for spoliation in Rhode Island is the ad-
verse inference, and this instruction does not adequately protect
the deprived party. The inference is permissive and is not to be
conclusive so thus, the parties may not necessarily be able to pre-
sent as strong a case as they would have, had the spoliation not
occurred. While remedies are available which have a greater de-
terrence to them and are more likely to assure proper redress for
the harmed party, such as a default judgment, the Rhode Island
courts are reluctant to impose such measures. The result is that,
absent a showing of "willfulness" on the part of the spoliator, a
party who claims to have been harmed by the destruction of evi-
dence is left with essentially one remedy, the adverse inference
jury instruction. The remedy is subject to several limitations
which leave the remedy entirely ineffective in many situations. To
ensure the integrity of the Rhode Island judicial system whereby a
party will feel that he or she has adequate protection from the in-
juries of spoliation, additional remedies must be recognized. An
independent cause of action for the spoliation of evidence is such a
remedy.
126. Id. at 1016.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1014.
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VI. CRAFTING AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SPOLIATION OF
EVIDENCE
As the tort of spoliation emerges and develops, courts are pro-
viding policy reasons that support adoption of the tort. Such rea-
sons include: (1) an independent tort action promotes the desire to
"protect testimonial candor, liberal discovery and the integrity of
the adversarial system"; (2) the cause of action protects the "prob-
able expectation" of a favorable judgment or defense in pending or
future litigation; and (3) the traditional remedies and court im-
posed sanctions are not effective enough or even available to deter
the spoliation of evidence. 129 Furthermore, the policy reasons for
adopting the independent tort have also been described in terms of
rules of equity.130 The tort is justified based on the rule of equity
favoring redress for every wrong, and the rule of equity that pro-
hibits an individual from profiting from his own wrong actions.
131
There is no question that independent causes of action for spolia-
tion may pose some challenges and perhaps some strains on the
system, however, none of the challenges are reason alone to accept
the status quo and ignore the existing inadequacies with the tra-
ditionally imposed remedies. It has been argued there are "com-
mon sense" alternatives to the tort of spoliation, 132 however, the
common sense alternatives offer little more than the traditional
remedies and leave the independent tort the only viable alterna-
tive for courts to properly resolve the inadequacies of the current
system.
In Smith v. Superior Court,133 the California Court of Appeals
became the first state appellate court to recognize an independent
tort for the spoliation of evidence. 3 4 In recognizing the tort , the
court stated that "[n]ew and nameless torts are being recognized
129. Ortego & Vogel, supra note 11.
130. See Morel, supra note 53, at 1182-83.
131. See id.
132. See Jonathan Judge, Reconsidering Spoliation: Common-Sense Alter-
natives to the Spoliation Tort, 2001 Wis. L. R. 441 (2001). In suggesting that
Wisconsin ought not adopt any such tort, the comment acknowledges that the
traditional remedies - inferences, sanctions, and criminal prosecution- have
"their own unique problems that demand attention and reform." Id. at 443.
133. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), overruled by Cedars-
Sinia Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998).
134. See Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
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constantly, and the progress of the common law is marked by
many cases of first impression."135 The court noted that "probable
expectancies" are a large part of what is important and valuable
in modern life, and courts must do more to "discover, define and
protect them from undue interference."136 In justifying the tort, the
court analogized intentional spoliation to the preexisting tort of
intentional interference with a perspective business advantage. 137
The court reasoned that a prospective civil action in a product li-
ability case is a valuable "probable expectancy," not unlike that
implicated in the existing tortious interference action. 38 From
there, the court held that an interference with such a "probable
expectancy" ought to be protected by the court.1 39
A. Recognized Causes of Action
While almost every jurisdiction makes available the tradi-
tional sanctions for the spoliation of evidence, some states have
taken steps to develop independent causes of action for spolia-
tion. 140 At last count, at least twelve jurisdictions have decided to
recognize such an independent cause of action in one form or an-
other. 14' Among these jurisdictions, the tort is often distinguished
135. Id. at 832 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 1, at 3 (4th ed. 1971)). The entire quote reads:
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the
progress of the common law is marked by many cases of first impres-
sion, in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new cause
of action, where none had been recognized before. The intentional in-
fliction of mental suffering.... the invasion of [the] right of privacy,
the denial of [the] right to vote, the conveyance of land to defeat a ti-
tle, the infliction of prenatal injuries, the alienation of the affections
of a parent,... to name only a few instances, could not be fitted into
any accepted classification when they first arose, but nevertheless
have been held to be torts. The law of torts is anything but static,
and the limits of its development are never set. When it becomes
clear that the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection
against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is
novel will not of itself operate as a bar to the remedy.
PROSSER, supra, at 3-4.
136. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
137. Id. at 836.
138. Id. at 837.
139. Id.
140. KOESEL ET AL., supra note 55, at 50.
141. Id. The states include: Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Illinois Indi-
ana, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, New Jersey, and Ohio. See
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on the basis of the conduct of the spoliator. Five jurisdictions have
recognized an independent tort for intentional spoliation, while
four jurisdictions provide tort relief even when the spoliator's be-
havior is simply negligent.142 Within those two groups, the tort
may further vary based on the relationship between the spoliator
and the individual harmed. 143
1. Intentional Spoliation- First and Third Parties
Courts that have acknowledged an independent cause of ac-
tion for intentional spoliation, emphasize their justification on the
inadequacies of the traditional remedies to compensate the
harmed party.14 4 While the California Court of Appeals did not ex-
pressly state the elements required to satisfy the newly created
tort of intentional spoliation of evidence in Smith, they may be in-
ferred as such: (1) the existence of a lawsuit or a potential lawsuit;
(2) knowledge by the spoliator that the suit or potential suit ex-
ists; (3) intentional acts of the spoliator in an attempt to destroy or
alter evidence that is relevant to the pending or potential suit; (4)
the actual destruction or alteration of the relevant evidence; and
(5) damages to the harmed party caused by the actions of the spo-
liator.145 In an action under intentional spoliation, it is the intent
to destroy destruction of the evidence, rather than the purpose for
destroying the evidence that is controlling.146
Intentional torts for spoliation may differ depending on
whether it is a third party or a party involved in the litigation that
that destroys the evidence. Some jurisdictions limit intentional
spoliation actions only to when the spoliation was done by the
id. (citing cases that have established the tort).
142. Id. at 50-51. Those adopting intentional spoliation are: Alaska, Idaho,
New Jersey, New Mexico, and Ohio, while those opting for negligent spolia-
tion are:. Florida, Montana, Alabama, and the District of Columbia (recogniz-
ing the tort based on negligence or recklessness). Id.
143. See Rivlin, supra note 25, at 1026-28 (discussing liability under
independent torts for first and third parties to the underlying litigation).
144. KOESEL ET AL., supra note 55, at 52.
145. Joe Wetzel, Spoiling an Illinois Personal Injury Plaintiffs Spoliation
Claim for Routinely Maintained Items, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 455, 459-60 (2004)
(citing Shannon D. Hutchings, Note, Tortious Liability For Spoliation of Evi-
dence 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 381, 384).
146. See id. at 460. "A spoliator may destroy evidence without a subjective
intent to avoid liability by discarding an item deemed unnecessary to keep."
Id.
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hands of a party to the underlying litigation. In Smith though, the
spoliation was the result of action by a third person, not a party to
the underlying litigation. Therefore, the traditional remedies
would be ineffective in fully compensating the injured party.147
However, if an independent tort for spoliation is recognized and
applies even when a third party commits the spoliation, the victim
of such behavior is provided with further protection that otherwise
would not be available. Whether the cause of action is to extend
beyond first parties or prospective first parties to third parties
must be articulated by the state courts. 148 This decision will often
depend on the policies used to support the court's recognition of
the tort, 49 but in either circumstance, the recognition of tort relief
enhances the victim's ability to be fully compensated for the wrong
that occurred because of the spoliation.
For example, the damages awarded for the intentional tort for
spoliation of evidence are similar to the economic damages that
are recoverable when an action is brought for the negligent or in-
tentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. 50
Along with the "probable expectancy" (which is the valuable inter-
est in the underlying suit), compensatory and perhaps even puni-
tive damages some of the remedies made available to the victim by
suing on this tort.151
2. Negligent Spoliation of Evidence
While some jurisdictions, as described above, require intent to
destroy the evidence as a prerequisite condition for a tort claim of
spoliation, others simply require negligence on the part of the spo-
liator. In the latter jurisdictions, the required elements for a cause
of action under the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence are gen-
147. See Maurice L. Kervin, Spoliation of Evidence: Why Mississippi
Should Adopt the Tort, 63 Miss. L.J. 227, 240 (1993). In Smith, the plaintiff
was injured when a wheel and tire from another vehicle crashed through her
windshield. 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831. The vehicle that lost the tire was towed to
a dealer who sold the vehicle, however, the dealer agreed to retain the tire,
wheel and other evidence for examination by the plaintiffs experts. Id. De-
spite the agreement, the dealer lost or destroyed the evidence, and it was
therefore impossible for the plaintiff to prove the cause of the accident; and
the plaintiff filed suit against the dealer. Id.
148. Daerr-Barron, supra note 10, at § 1.
149. Id. at § 21.
150. Id. at § 28.
151. Id.
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erally: (1) the existence of a potential civil action; (2) a duty to pre-
serve relevant evidence to the potential civil action;152 (3) the de-
struction of the evidence; (4) a significant impairment in the
ability to prove the claim in the potential suit; (5) a causal rela-
tionship between the spoliation and the inability to prove the
claim; and (6) damages suffered by the party alleging spoliation. 153
Negligent spoliation usually arises in one of two situations.
The first typical scenario involves a party who "unintentionally
destroys or loses evidence which has a favorable effect on his posi-
tion." 54 The second situation involves an independent third party
who destroys, alters or loses evidence in the potential or pending
suit.1 55 Some states have acknowledged the theory of negligent
spoliation under their traditional negligence laws, without directly
stating that a new cause of action (an independent tort for spolia-
tion of evidence) is being created."56
While negligent spoliation may seem more innocent than in-
tentional spoliation, the results can be just as damaging to the in-
jured party. The ability to prove a claim may be dependent upon
the piece of evidence that was lost, or destroyed, albeit without
any intent to do so. It is this very reason that some courts have
recognized the separate cause of action for negligent spoliation.
B. Criticisms of an Independent Tort
Despite the added protections offered to victims of spoliation
through the recognition of an independent tort for such behavior,
recognition of any such a tort has not been without criticism. It
has been argued that there are "common sense" alternatives to the
spoliation tort. 57 However, "common sense" alternatives are noth-
152. The court's recognition of an independent tort for spoliation would
create the necessary duty of care to preserve evidence. See Rivlin, supra note
25, at 1027-28.
153. KOESEL ET AL., supra note 55, at 55.
154. John K. Stipancich, The Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: An Inde-
pendent Tort Action May be the Only Acceptable Alternative, 53 OHIO ST. L.J.
1135, 1140 (1992).
155. Id.
156. KOESEL ET AL., supra note 55, at 56. Koesel points to a case from Illi-
nois where the court held that "an action for negligent spoliation can be
stated under existing negligence law without creating a new tort." Id. (quot-
ing Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ill. 1995).
157. See Judge, supra note 132. In suggesting that Wisconsin ought not to
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ing more than the traditional remedies already in use. 158 The most
commonly cited reasons states provide when rejecting the tort are
"that current remedies adequately address spoliation problems,
and that the tort would be all but unworkable in practice."159
Specifically, it is claimed "that (1) a legal duty to preserve evi-
dence unjustly interferes with property rights; (2) the alleged in-
jury is too attenuated; and (3) the tort risks excessive and
duplicative litigation." 60 Other courts that have refused to permit
a cause of action have also criticized the tort for addition reasons
such as: (1) there are a number of traditional remedies available;
(2) when the spoliator is a nonparty, there is no duty to the
harmed litigant; and (3) the destruction of evidence is reasonable
given the particular facts and circumstances of the case. 16'
However, these criticisms do not withstand scrutiny and should
not prevent states from adopting laws recognizing a cause of ac-
tion in tort against spoliators of evidence.
For example, the duty to preserve evidence is not absolute,
and thus the fears that an independent tort would require "all in-
dividuals to constantly be on notice that their property could be
needed in a lawsuit," 62 is unfounded. Whether or not a person has
a duty to preserve items of evidence is dependent on three main
factors: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the "reason-
able foreseeability" of the type of harm to the individual bringing
the suit; and (3) the public policy promoted by recognizing an en-
forceable duty. 63 Depending on the extent such a duty is to be ex-
tended would be reflected in the court's recognition of the tort and
the policies in support of such recognition.
Similarly, the speculative nature of the injury is not reason
enough to abandon the tort. There are other areas of the law
where injuries may be somewhat uncertain; however, this does not
adopt any such independent spoliation tort, the comment, however, acknowl-
edges that the traditional remedies - inferences, sanctions, and criminal
prosecutions - have "their own unique problems that demand attention and
reform." Id. at 443.
158. See id. at 462-70.
159. Id. at 450-51.
160. Id. at 451.
161. See Rivlin, supra note 25, at 1023.
162. Judge, supra note 132, at 451.
163. Ortega & Vogel, supra note 11, at 2.
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act as a bar to providing proper relief.16 Further, some argue
against the tort on the grounds of preserving the concept of res ju-
dicata, and to avoid duplicate or excessive litigation. Those who
criticize an independent tort action for spoliation argue that the
tort would become a "second-chance sweepstakes for every party
disgruntled with the outcome of a lawsuit."165 Again, this interest
must be balanced against the situations where the victim may
never be able to have their claim properly litigated in the first
place. If a party or non-party spoliates evidence, the spoliator
should not be insulated from liability for her wrongdoing merely
because one party has prevailed in the underlying litigation.
C. The Appropriate Cause of Action for Rhode Island Courts
The underlying question in determining whether or not to
recognize an independent tort for spoliation, and if so, what type,
is whether the existing rules, procedures, sanctions, and torts are
sufficient to maintain the integrity of the court system. 66 Judicial
integrity requires that relevant evidence be presented in the quest
for truth and fairness in resolving civil actions. 67 In Rhode Island,
the traditional spoliation remedies can be effective in upholding
the integrity of the judicial system when properly applied in many
situations. These situations involve spoliation that results from
the conduct of a party-litigant. However, as seen, these traditional
remedies are not always sufficient in dealing with first party liti-
gants. Furthermore, when spoliation results from the conduct of a
third party, either negligently or intentionally, the traditional
remedies are in effective and threaten the absolute integrity of the
state's judiciary. For this reason, the appropriate tort ought to
recognize a cause of action for the intentional or negligent spolia-
tion of evidence by first or third parties. It is well established that
a third party property owner has a right to do what he may with
164. Some examples include (1) future earnings in personal injury and
wrongful death suits, which are often uncertain, yet still recoverable; (2) pat-
ent or trademark infringement cases where damage awards are often sub-
stantial despite lack of proof of economic or emotional harm; and (3) tort
action such as libel, slander, and invasion of privacy. See Rivlin, supra note
25, at 1030.
165. Judge, supra note 132, at 458.
166. See Ortega & Vogel, supra note 11.
167. Id.
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his property, including dispose of or destroy the property.168 The
problem is that a litigant to an underlying civil action may be
harmed by the third party's conduct.
To satisfy such a claim, the following elements would have to
be met: (1) pending or probable litigation; (2) knowledge on the
part of the defendant (in the spoliation suit) that litigation exists
or is probable; (3) willful or negligent destruction of evidence by
the defendant that disrupts the plaintiffs case; (4) a disruption in
the plaintiffs case; (5) damages proximately caused by the defen-
dant. The tort action may be brought against a first or third party,
and may be brought at the same time as the underlying litigation.
Recognition of such a cause of action with theses elements directly
addresses the two underlying policies of deterrence and compensa-
tion. A victim of spoliation will not be barred from seeking redress
due to the fact that the alleged spoliator is not a party to the un-
derlying litigation. Similarly, anyone who acquires or posses evi-
dence which they know is relevant to pending or probable
litigation, will be deterred from any form of conduct (willful or
negligent) related to the evidence that may disrupt the plaintiffs
underlying litigation. However, this would not result in a land-
slide of litigation from plaintiffs who want a second bite at the ap-
ple by filing an independent spoliation action. The five required
elements provide safeguards for the defendant in the tort action.
In order for the plaintiff to recover, she must carry the burden of
proving her claim against the tortfeasor. Failure to establish any
of the five elements will result in a decision favoring the defen-
dant. The proposed independent tort properly and equitably ad-
dresses the concerns and rights of all those potentially involved in
an action brought under the newly established tort.
In Rhode Island, judicial recognition of an independent cause
of action will require additional persuasion due to the Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court's position articulated in Ferreria v. Strack169
that, "[t]his Court has long held that the creation of new causes of
action should be left to the Legislature."170 While the Court's
stance on new causes of action may appear to be well established,
168. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 787-90 (2005) (discussing the history and jurisprudence of the right to destroy
one's property).
169. 652 A.2d 965 (R.I. 1995).
170. Id. at 968 (declining to create social host tort liability).
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the reasoning applied in Ferreria is not applicable to a cause of ac-
tion for spoliation of evidence. In Ferreria, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court declined to create social host tort liability; in doing so
it noted that, "[t]he majority of courts in other jurisdictions faced
with the question of extending common-law tort liability to the so-
cial-host guest context have deferred to the Legislature. The rea-
soning for this deferral is their consideration is that the question
raised is one of broad public policy rather than an interpretation
of the common law."171 The same cannot be said of the jurisdictions
that have been faced with the question of recognizing a cause of
action for the spoliation of evidence in civil matters. This issue is
well established as one for the courts to decide because to date,
there has been no attempt by the legislature of any state to over-
turn a decision of a court that has decided the matter either
way. 172 Because the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not specifi-
cally stated that this is an issue for the legislature, and the over-
whelming recognition that the issue is one belonging to the courts,
the Rhode Island judiciary is not precluded from creating a new
independent cause of action for spoliation. In fact, in fulfilling its
duty to maintain justice, it must recognize such a claim.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the doctrine of spoliation as an independent tort is not
perfect, it certainly addresses many of the policies that aim to de-
ter such conduct and allow for more accurate and just proceeding
in civil courts. By comparing the alternative remedies offered by
independent causes of action against the effectiveness of the tradi-
tional remedies presently available in Rhode Island, it is obvious
that a tort for the spoliation of evidence is warranted. The policies
most advanced by an independent tort are that of deterrence, ade-
quate compensation for the victim, and insuring a fair and just
civil proceeding where claims can be heard with all the relevant
evidence. Of the different permutations of the spoliation tort,
those that allow such claims for intentional or negligent spoliation
by a first or third party appear to be the most effective at further-
ing these policies. As time and technology advance, the courts
ought to be aware of the alternative torts and recognize that they
171. Id.
172. Daerr-Bannon, supra note 10, at § 1.
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may be more effective in meeting unanticipated challenges to pre-
serve the integrity of the courts and to assure victims are compen-
sated for their losses.
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